NAFTA: Regional Trade Agreement and the Creation of International Law

20 Jul 2010 by Fausto Sicha, No Comments »

By: Fausto Sicha

DOWNLOAD THE FULL ARTICLE AS PDF

    The North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations in the early 1990s created lots of controversy between two opposite groups; those who favored the agreement and those who opposed it. Almost 15 years later NAFTA has produced mixed results and therefore the contradictions have not vanished away.

          The international law created under NAFTA is a complex set of rules and norms that binds three countries together; Mexico, the United States, and Canada. The aim of this agreement is to: first, eliminate barriers to trade and facilitate the cross-border movement of goods and services among the parties. Second, promote conditions of fair competition. Third, increase investment opportunities. Fourth, provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. Fifth, create effective procedures for the implementation and application of the agreements, and sixth, establish a framework for trilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits of the agreement.[1]

          The controversy of this agreement began because “bringing Mexico into the fold, the United States and Canada became the first countries with well developed civil societies to extend free trade status to a developing country that had not yet created the cultural infrastructure needed for a well-developed civil society.”[2] On the one hand, opponents of the agreement like Mr. Kenny Lortz, an employee of Cummins Diesel, during a hearing in the One Hundred Second Congress Session said; “even if we were willing to compete, we would not be able to unless we are willing to lower our standards of living.”[3]Opponent of the agreement also included “environmental activists who were concern that Mexico’s lax environmental protection status would harm the rivers, air, and health of the people living in the Rio Grande Valley.”[4]

          On the other hand, the business community favored the agreement. According to a survey taken in the U.S. 72 percent of the business executives supported NAFTA. In fact, business supporters not only favored the treaty, but they also formed an umbrella organization called Coalition for Trade Expansion which included more than 500 corporations and lobbyists.[5]

          A close look at the NAFTA Charter reveals that this agreement was designed to increment and improve trade among the three parties, but it did not addressed very well other concerns like labor and environmental issues. To ensure that the objectives of the agreement would be reached the parties established a Free Trade Commission which would be composed by cabinet-level representatives of the parties. The Commission’s job is to supervise the implementation of the agreement, oversee its further elaboration, resolve disputes, and supervise the work of all committees and working groups established under this agreement. Furthermore, the commission may also establish and delegate responsibilities to ad hoc or standing committees, seek the advice of non-governmental persons, and take action in the exercise of its functions as the Parties may agree.[6]

          Besides the Commission, a Secretariat was also established and its’ main job is to provide assistance to the commission, and provide administrative assistance to panel and committees established under NAFTA’S chapter 19.[7] Because these institutions were created as part of the agreement, it can be argued that international law created under NAFTA took a normative system; it certainly provides directions for international relations by identifying its goals and it takes a legislative character by mandating particular values and directing specific changes in states behavior.[8] It can be also argued that international law created under NAFTA resembles hard law. It’s charter refers to legally binding obligations that are precise and reciprocal. Furthermore, it delegates authority to the ad hoc tribunals and to the two institutions created under the supplemental agreement to interpret and implement the law.[9]

          Ad hoc tribunals created under NAFTA to monitor compliance and resolve disputes make this international law of the category of Second order compliance. NAFTA’s chapter XI empowers investors to bring claims against host governments.[10]  Furthermore, chapter XI details four procedures allowing private actors to bring claims against the Parties;

          First, each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments. Second, each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investments of its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments. Third, no Party may impose on an investor of another Party a requirement that a minimum level of equity in an enterprise in the territory of the Party be held by its nationals, other than nominal qualifying shares for directors or incorporators of corporations, and fourth, n o party may require an investor of another Party, by reason of its nationality, to sell or otherwise dispose of an investment in the territory of the Party.[11]

          Besides chapter XI, NAFTA’s chapter XIX also “allows corporations and governments to challenge parties’ antidumping and countervailing-duty determination; and the supplemental agreement allows persons and nongovernmental organizations to claim that the parties are failing to effectively enforce their domestic environmental and labor laws.[12]

          The supplemental agreements discussed under NAFTA created two more institutions; first, the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (NACEC), its job is to establish procedures by which interested persons my request the preparation of a “factual record” by the Secretariat. The factual record will report on whether a NAFTA Party is effectively enforcing its environmental law. Second, the North American Commission for Labor

          Cooperation (NACLC), it obligates each party to establish a National Administrative Office to hear complaints concerning labor law enforcement in the Parties.[13]

          Knowing that Mexico has a law similar to the US law with regards to environmental standards, but also aware that compliance in Mexico is far lower, the United States proposed the creation of NACEC.[14] This move by the United States responded to the concerns of some environmentalists who opposed a free trade zone because they feared that the free trade agreement would accelerate investment and production along the border and in Mexico City, exacerbating an already serious problem. Concerned environmentalists argued that firms would move south to avoid tougher laws and enforcement in the U.S. and Canada,[15]and according to them, Mexico’s lack of enforcement of environmental law would accelerate job flight from US companies.[16]Therefore, NACEC was created with the purpose of addressing; first, the pesticide residues on Mexican products exported to the U.S., second, pesticide poisonings of Mexican farm workers, and third, damage to the physical environment.[17]

          The U.S. also proposed the labor side agreement in order to calm down the fear of some people who argued that U.S. companies would relocate to Mexico in order to take advantage of lower labor costs that give a comparative advantage to this country.[18] “Like the environmental agreement, the labor agreement creates a procedure through which a party may claim that another party has engaged in a persistent pattern of ineffective enforcement, and provides for another procedure through which nongovernmental actors may raise claims of ineffective enforcement.”[19]

          NAFTA’S law which is designed to bind the three Parties together follows acceptable standards of international law. However, as it was stated before, this legal agreement offers more benefits to the business community than to the labor community. If one assumes that in these two communities there are different interests, then, it is understandable that almost 15 years after the agreement there still is support and opposition to NAFTA treaty.

          Even though opposition still persists, according to Jaime Sierra Puche – Mexico’s Commerce Secretary who negotiated the agreement –  NAFTA has been a huge success because its two objectives;  to help increase Mexico’s export capacity, and the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment has been achieved.[20]

          From the business community perspective it certainly seems that NAFTA has achieved its objective. For example, in 1994, more than 200 U.S. firms move their operations to Mexico, and during the first six months of implementation of the treaty, Mexican exports had increased 20 percent and U.S. exports to Mexico has jumped by 17 percent.[21] In April 2000, in a hearing before Congress, Kenneth Mackay, special envoy for the Americas argued that, “NAFTA has helped the U.S. economy remain strong.[22] Bryan Samuel, acting Assistance Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, from the Department of State also defended the treaty, and said, “the economic benefits of NAFTA are clear. It has generated growth and economic momentum for many regions, communities and individual citizens. NAFTA has helped spur the creation of a North American market characterized by low and declining trade barriers, common standards, enhanced cooperation on labor and environment issues and economic innovation and dynamism. Trade among the three NAFTA countries has grown by 96 percent since NAFTA entered into force in 1994. In dollar figures, our trilateral trade increased from $289 billion in 1993 to about $570 billion in 1999.”[23]Ted McNamara, President and CEO of the Council of the Americas, also saw as positive the impact of NAFTA, according to him, “since 1993, trade among the U.S., Canada, and Mexico is up more that 85%.”[24]Other economist and experts also consider the impact of NAFTA as positive, for example an expert in economics argued that largely thanks to the trade agreement, the Mexican economy managed to grow between 5 and 6% from 1994 to 1997.[25]

          The economic impact of NAFTA at least in some areas of the three economies does seem to have a positive outcome. For example, Mexico has emerged as an export base for cars, trucks, and automobile parts more swiftly and dramatically than anyone could have imagined. “In 1995, domestic sales were only 185,000 vehicles and exports increased to 781,000, but in 1996, sales in Mexico rose to 334,000 units, while exports soared to 975,000.”[26]

          There is no point in denying the economic benefits of NAFTA. However, not all people are seeing the benefits of this trade agreement. In fact, a good number of people have been deeply affected by it, and for them life has become simply more difficult.

          Therefore, from the point of view of the campesinos and labor workers in general, NAFTA has not been a success. Since the beginning of the debate the Democrat Senator Metzenbaun from Ohio argued “that this agreement does not address labor or worker rights, the environment, and health and safety standards adequately.”[27]The senator also cautioned that “the agreement will cost hundreds of thousands of jobs and threaten the standards of living for millions of Americans.”[28]

          Perhaps the biggest problem for agriculture workers in Mexico is the issue of completion. With NAFTA, campesinos in Mexico were suddenly confronted with the prospect of competing with large U.S.  and Canadian agribusiness corporations.[29]From the campesinos’ point of view, the agreement did not addressed the concern of them despite the fact that in Mexico corn is produced by approximately 2.4 million poor family farmers.

          Before NAFTA, corn and beans were protected through import restrictions and a guaranteed farm price offered by Bonasupo, but now with the agreement the government must stop protecting national agriculture products and the market will determine the price.[30]

          Aware that the effects of NAFTA have devastated the small agriculture producers, it is fair to say that “the trade treaty has increased Mexico’s exports and expanded its middle class [and] has left small farmers without a share of the prosperity. Today, the farmers are just as poor as they were before NAFTA, [and] the government has done little since then to help them move beyond subsistence farming.”[31]

            But farmers and labor workers as well as unionist who opposed NAFTA did not only suffer the negative effects of the treaty, but they were also persecuted for their opposition to it. If fact “the Reclusorio del Oriente, the federal prison in the eastern district of Mexico City, is [considered] the free trade prison. In 1995 and 1996, as the government of President Ernesto Zedillo overhauled the Mexican economy, the Reclusorio del Orient became the destination for workers and unionists who stood in the way of economic reform.”[32]Fortunately, the government did not abandoned the prisoners completely, and in fact, it continued to negotiate with the union’s leaders over the elimination of their jobs, but those talks took place inside the prison’s offices, with the warden acting as a go-between, therefore, some leaders went further and argued that they are being forced to negotiate with a gun in their heads.[33]

          The assumption of agriculture workers and small business that NAFTA will not benefit them was well founded, and they were certainly correct to claim that the treaty was designed to have profound damaging consequences. For example, in 1995, “the confederation of Mexican Workers announced that two businesses a day had been closing in Mexico…and the nation’s giant oil monopoly Pemex, announced that 3,000 of its employees would be laid off.”[34]

          Layoffs were not a surprise for workers, they knew that the loss of Mexican jobs will occur in spite of increase in manufacturing employment.”[35]But even if jobs remain as they were, campesinos knew that the trade agreement would still not benefit them because they don’t have agricultural machinery to compete with big US and Canadian corporations. Furthermore, they knew that the condition of the roads in Mexico makes marketing a perishable commodity nearly impossible, and that finding a buyer for the small quantity of their products that their small property can produce was going to be a Herculean task.[36]

          But as agriculture producers were losing jobs and were unable to compete, other sectors of the Mexican economy were getting the “benefits” of NAFTA. Maquiladoras in Mexico, especially those close to the border saw an increase in the number of its employees. “At the end of 2000, there were more than 3,700 firms; employing more than 1.3 million workers [and by this time] the maquiladoras became the main source of creation of industrial jobs.”[37]

          “The maquiladora activities that grew most rapidly were the manufacture of auto parts.”[38] This meant that even with the amount of jobs created by the growing number of maquiladoras, job opportunities was greater for people with a descent level of education and not for the campesinos whose level of education is low. 

          According to the evidence, it can be said that NAFTA at least in a part accomplished its goals – increased trade, attracted foreign direct investment, eliminated tariffs etc. However, it can also be argued – as union leaders, workers, campesinos and small business owners argued – that NAFTA did not addressed the concerns of labor workers in the U.S. and the campesinos in Mexico, despite the fact that political leaders promised that “everyone will benefit from the agreement.” Today, it can be argued that one of the reasons why NAFTA “remains controversial is that advocates and opponents were guilty of exaggerating its potential impact. Advocates claimed that it would create hundreds of thousands of job from the dramatic rise in exports, and opponents claimed it would destroy far more jobs from a flood of imports entering the United States and a stampede of U.S. companies moving to Mexico to take advantage of cheap labor.”[39]

          An interesting fact that can be learned from international law that NAFTA created is that with regards to foreign direct investment and despite dire predictions the treaty “did not caused an exodus of manufacturing investment to Mexico. Yes, U.S. investment in Mexico did increase after NAFTA, along with trade but it remains a trickle compared with annual investment in the domestic U.S. economy. Lower wages are not the only reason why U.S. companies invest abroad. Foreign direct investment seeks wealthy consumers, modern infrastructure, open trade, the rule of law, protected property rights, and an educated and productive workforce. For all these reasons, U.S. companies invest far more in other advanced, high-wage, high-standard economies than they do in less-developed countries such as Mexico.”[40]

          When the treaty was being negotiated and when this international law was being created, the three Party leaders sought support for this agreement claiming that the benefits will not only be for big corporations but also for workers and small business. In fact, President Salinas from Mexico “told his countrymen that free trade would deliver them from the Third World to the developed economies.”[41]Furthermore, President Salinas told his people, “I don’t want Mexicans living the country anymore, only our products.”[42]Sadly enough, a few years later, a massive number of Mexicans were crossing the border illegally. This sudden migration increase triggered a reaction in the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) office and as a consequence in 1997, the INS spent $800 million on the southwest border enforcement, up from $400 million in 1993; also the Border Patrol along the southwest border grew by 83% from 3,389 to 6,213 agents.[43]

          Considering the overall effects of NAFTA it does not seem to be consistent with President Salinas’ claim that this treaty will take Mexico to the rank of developed nations. “Since the implementation of NAFTA, Mexico’s annual GDP growth has averaged a mere 2.5% and only 1.1% in per-person terms.”[44]Can anyone argue that at this pace Mexico is truly in its path to be a developed nation?

          In the U.S. also similar promises were made regarding job creation. “The White House claimed that free trade would createbetween 44,000 to 150,000 new American jobs.”[45] U.S. supportive economists also “predicted that 170,000 jobs would be created during the first year [of NAFTA].”[46] However, today it is well known that the amount of jobs that were supposed to be created with this trade agreement is far lower than it was initially claimed.

          The low amount of job creation and the higher number of Mexican immigrants leaving the country is not consistent with what the supporters and proponents of NAFTA argued during the initial debates. However, it is also evident that trade has increased among the three countries, and that the manufacturing sector especially in the Mexican Border has increased considerably, but these positive results have not addressed the environmental problems, labor conditions, and workers’ rights issues.

          Another interesting effect of NAFTA in the Mexican economy is its role in the peso crisis. Because of market deregulations, “on 20 December 1994, the Mexican government decided to let the peso float. By the end of January 1995, the peso had lost 50% of its value.”[47] Today it is evident that deregulated financial flows can destabilize regional economies in the process of integration. In Mexico, a number of domestic policy errors and external shocks contributed to the economic crisis. But the most important mistake was excessive reliance in NAFTA’s highly liquid sources of foreign savings to finance long-term development.[48]But not all are bad news; the other side of the story indicates that  the growth of trade thanks to NAFTA allowed Mexico to recuperate quickly from its economic crisis. In fact, Mexican economic output reached pre-crisis levels in two years.[49]However, this quick recovery is also attributed o the U.S. economic aid. The U.S. aware that the peso crisis may affect trade and Mexico’s purchasing power, and aware that American jobs and investments may be affected decided to help Mexico with an economic package of $40 billion.[50]

          The mixed results of NAFTA without a doubt will continue to have two contradicting groups; one that favors it and claims that it is beneficial for the parties’ national economies, the other that opposes and claims that it is devastating the most vulnerable sectors of society, like the campesinos in Mexico, and manufacture workers in the United States.

          One thing that does not seem clear is how constitutional or unconstitutional NAFTA is.  Article 2, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution requires treaties to be approved by two thirds of the Senate. The Constitution reads, “The President shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”[51] But despite this provision,  NAFTA was approved as a congressional-executive agreement by simple minorities in both houses.[52]

          Why the Constitutional question was never raised? A review of history clarifies the answer to this question. “Just like other congressional-executive agreements that took place since the New Deal, NAFTA became a symbol of new-fangled internationalist entanglements.”[53]”The founders’ ‘antidemocratic’ and ‘outmoded’ decision to privilege ‘one third plus one’ of the Senate no longer monopolizes our constitutional vision. It remains available as an option but is not longer a requirement.”[54]

          According to the relevant literature it looks like that the birth of the congressional-executive agreements came to be not as a result of amending the Constitution but as a self-conscious ad hoc process. Especially during the last forty years, Congress consolidated this practice by passing status that used the congressional-executive agreement as a tool for the control of foreign policy.[55]

          The roots of this practice can be found in The Trade Act of 1974. “The Trade Act transformed the congressional-executive agreement into a highly sophisticated tool for modern diplomacy.”[56]Therefore, even though the Constitution was never amended, NAFTA cannot be considered unconstitutional because, “the Trade Act provides a dynamic framework through which Congress can give effective advice before the President signs on the dotted line…, the Trade Act insists that the President consult with all relevant congressional committees, include members of Congress in American negotiating delegation, and provide ninety-day notice on an intention to sign any agreement.”[57]

          Despite the mixed results I would like to conclude by saying that NAFTA has not live up to its promise as it is outlined in Chapter I, Article, 101, objective two which reads – promote conditions of fair competition. There is not fairness where a campesino from Mexico has to compete with a U.S. or Canadian corporation. There is not fairness, in stimulating one sector of the economy and denying the benefits of the agreement to the most vulnerable sectors; in Mexico this is what happened to the Maize producers and agricultural workers in general. Finally, It cannot be denied that in Mexico as a result of this agreement a good number of people from the most vulnerable sectors of society not only had to leave their agricultural practice but the country itself, and emigrate illegally to the United States.

Bibliography

Ackerman, Bruce and Golove, David. “Is NAFTA Constitutional.” February, 1995: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 108, No. 4. Published by: The Harvard Law Review Association.

Aland de Janvry, Elisabeth Sadoulet, Benjamin Davis. December 1995:“NAFTA’s Impact on Mexico: Rural Household-Level Effects.” American Journal of Agriculture Economies, Vol. 77, No. 5, Proceedings Issue. Blackwell Publishing.

Andreas, Peter. “The Escalation of U.S. Immigration Control in the Post-NAFTA Era.” Winter 1998-1999: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 113, No. 4. Published by: the Academy of Political Science.

Avery, William P. “Domestic Interests in NAFTA Bargaining.” Summer 1998: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 113, No. 2. Published by: The Academy of Political Science.

Bacon, David. The Children of NAFTA: Labor Wars on the U.S./Mexico Border. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004

 Blank Stephen, and Jerry Haar. Making NAFTA Work: U.S. Firms and the New North American Business Environment. Florida: North-South Center Press, 1998

 Cameron, Maxwell A. and Aggarwal, Vinod K. “Mexican Meltdown: States, Market, and Post-NAFTA Financial Turmoil.” December, 1996: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 5. Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.

David G. Abler, and Daniel Pick. “NAFTA, Agriculture, and the Environment in Mexico.” August 1993: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 75, No. 3. Blackwell Publishing.

Knox, John H. “The 2005 Activity of the NAFTA Tribunals.” April 2006: The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, No. 2. Published by: American Society of International Law.

KU, Charlotte and Diehl Paul. International Law; Classic and Contemporary Readings. Second ed. Lynne Reinner Publishers, Colorado U.S.A. 2003.

Mace, Gordon. Regionalism and the State: NAFTA and Foreign Policy Convergence. Canada: Ashgate, 2007

Nafta charter, chapter 20 article 2001; the free trade commission and article 2002; the Secretariat.

NYU School of Law. The NAFTA and Political Economy of Regionalism. Htpp://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990205.html

Peloso, Jennifer. Free Trade. Printed in the United States of America: H.W. Wilson Company, 2005

Randall, Laura. Changing Structure of Mexico. Political, social, and economic prospects. 2nd ed. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1994

Robey, John S. “Civil Society and NAFTA.” September 1999: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 565. No. Civil Society and Democratization.

 S. Hrg. 102-1175. “NAFTA: The Hidden  Costs of Free Trade.” Hearing before the subcommittee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate; One Hundred Second Congress, Second Session. October 16,  1992

S. Hrg. 103-66 “U.S. Trade Policy and NAFTA.” Hearing Before the Committee on Finance; United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, First Session. March 9, 1993

S. Hrg. 106-751 “Lesson of NAFTA For the U.S. Relations with the Americas.” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism of the Committee on Foreign Relations; United State Senate; One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, April 27, 2000.

Smith, Gery. “NAFTA: Two Mexicos, Two Outcomes.” February 13, 2008: Section: Top News. Htpp://www.BusinessWeekOnline.org.

The Economist. “Tequila Slammer. The Peso Crisis, ten years on Mexico has still not fully recovered from its worst financial crisis.” Section: Finance and Economics. January, 2005: Economist, Vol. 374, Issue 8407.

U.S. Constitution. Art. II, cl. 2.

Young, Wilcox Linda. “Free Trade or Fair Trade?: Winter 1995: “NAFTA and Agricultural Labor.” Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 22, No. 1, Labor and Free Market in the Americas. 1995. Sage Publications, Inc.


[1] NAFTA, Art. 102: Objectives.

[2] Robey, John S. “Civil Society and NAFTA.” September 1999: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 565. No. Civil Society and Democratization. p 116 

[3] S. Hrg. 102-1175. “NAFTA: The Hidden Costs of Free Trade.” Hearing before the subcommittee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate; One Hundred Second Congress, Second Session. October 16,  1992 p 21

[4] Robey, John S. “Civil Society and NAFTA.” September 1999: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 565. No. Civil Society and Democratization. p 117

[5] Avery, William P. “Domestic Interests in NAFTA Bargaining.” Summer 1998: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 113, No. 2. Published by: The Academy of Political Science. p 284

[6] Nafta charter, chapter 20 article 2001; the free trade commission and article 2002; the Secretariat.

[7] Nafta charter, chapter 20 article 2001; the free trade commission and article 2002; the Secretariat.

[8] KU, Charlotte and Diehl Paul. International Law; Classic and Contemporary Readings. Second ed. Lynne Reinner Publishers, Colorado U.S.A. 2003.

[9] KU, Charlotte and Diehl Paul. International Law; Classic and Contemporary Readings. Second ed. Lynne Reinner Publishers, Colorado U.S.A. 2003.

[10] Knox, John H. “The 2005 Activity of the NAFTA Tribunals.” April 2006: The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, No. 2. Published by: American Society of International Law. p 429

[11] NAFTA Charter, Chapter XI

[12] Knox, John H. “The 2005 Activity of the NAFTA Tribunals.” April 2006: The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, No. 2. Published by: American Society of International Law. p 429

[13] NYU School of Law. The NAFTA and Political Economy of Regionalism. Htpp://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990205.html. p 2, 3

[14] Knox, John H. “The 2005 Activity of the NAFTA Tribunals.” April 2006: The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, No. 2. Published by: American Society of International Law. p 438

[15] Avery, William P. “Domestic Interests in NAFTA Bargaining.” Summer 1998: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 113, No. 2. Published by: The Academy of Political Science. p 287

[16] Avery, William P. “Domestic Interests in NAFTA Bargaining.” Summer 1998: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 113, No. 2. Published by: The Academy of Political Science. p 289

[17] David G. Abler, and Daniel Pick. “NAFTA, Agriculture, and the Environment in Mexico.” August 1993: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 75, No. 3. Blackwell Publishing. p 794

[18] Knox, John H. “The 2005 Activity of the NAFTA Tribunals.” April 2006: The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, No. 2. Published by: American Society of International Law. p 440

[19] Knox, John H. “The 2005 Activity of the NAFTA Tribunals.” April 2006: The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, No. 2. Published by: American Society of International Law. p 440

[20] Smith, Gery. “NAFTA: Two Mexicos, Two Outcomes.” February 13, 2008: Section: Top News. Htpp://www.BusinessWeekOnline.org. p 1

[21] Robey, John S. “Civil Society and NAFTA.” September 1999: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 565. No. Civil Society and Democratization. p 119

[22] S. Hrg. 106-751 “Lesson of NAFTA For the U.S. Relations with the Americas.” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism of the Committee on Foreign Relations; United State Senate; One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, April 27, 2000. p 4

[23]  p S. Hrg. 106-751 “Lesson of NAFTA For the U.S. Relations with the Americas.” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism of the Committee on Foreign Relations; United State Senate; One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, April 27, 2000. 10

[24]  p S. Hrg. 106-751 “Lesson of NAFTA For the U.S. Relations with the Americas.” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism of the Committee on Foreign Relations; United State Senate; One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, April 27, 2000.23

[25] The Economist. “Tequila Slammer. The Peso Crisis, ten years on Mexico has still not fully recovered from its worst financial crisis.” Section: Finance and Economics. January, 2005: Economist, Vol. 374, Issue 8407. p 1

[26] Blank Stephen, and Jerry Haar. Making NAFTA Work: U.S. Firms and the New North American Business Environment. Florida: North-South Center Press, 1998. P 67

[27] S. Hrg. 102-1175. “NAFTA: The Hidden Costs of Free Trade.” Hearing before the subcommittee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate; One Hundred Second Congress, Second Session. October 16,  1992 p 1

[28] S. Hrg. 102-1175. “NAFTA: The Hidden Costs of Free Trade.” Hearing before the subcommittee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate; One Hundred Second Congress, Second Session. October 16,  1992 p 3

[29]Robey, John S. “Civil Society and NAFTA.” September 1999: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 565. No. Civil Society and Democratization. p 117

[30] Aland de Janvry, Elisabeth Sadoulet, Benjamin Davis. December 1995:“NAFTA’s Impact on Mexico: Rural Household-Level Effects.” American Journal of Agriculture Economies, Vol. 77, No. 5, Proceedings Issue. Blackwell Publishing. p 1283

[31] Smith, Gery. “NAFTA: Two Mexicos, Two Outcomes.” February 13, 2008: Section: Top News. Htpp://www.BusinessWeekOnline.org. p 1

[32]  p Bacon, David. The Children of NAFTA: Labor Wars on the U.S./Mexico Border. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004. p 223

[33]  p Bacon, David. The Children of NAFTA: Labor Wars on the U.S./Mexico Border. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004. p 224

[34] Robey, John S. “Civil Society and NAFTA.” September 1999: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 565. No. Civil Society and Democratization. p 120

[35] Young, Wilcox Linda. “Free Trade or Fair Trade?: Winter 1995: “NAFTA and Agricultural Labor.” Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 22, No. 1, Labor and Free Market in the Americas. 1995. Sage Publications, Inc. p 49

[36] Young, Wilcox Linda. “Free Trade or Fair Trade?: Winter 1995: “NAFTA and Agricultural Labor.” Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 22, No. 1, Labor and Free Market in the Americas. 1995. Sage Publications, Inc. p 53

[37] Randall, Laura. Changing Structure of Mexico. Political, social, and economic prospects. 2nd ed. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1994. p 269

[38] Randall, Laura. Changing Structure of Mexico. Political, social, and economic prospects. 2nd ed. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1994. p 269

[39] Peloso, Jennifer. Free Trade. Printed in the United States of America: H.W. Wilson Company, 2005. p 55

[40] Peloso, Jennifer. Free Trade. Printed in the United States of America: H.W. Wilson Company, 2005. p 58

[41] Robey, John S. “Civil Society and NAFTA.” September 1999: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 565. No. Civil Society and Democratization. p 117

[42] Robey, John S. “Civil Society and NAFTA.” September 1999: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 565. No. Civil Society and Democratization. p 118

[43] Andreas, Peter. “The Escalation of U.S. Immigration Control in the Post-NAFTA Era.” Winter 1998-1999: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 113, No. 4. Published by: the Academy of Political Science. p 595

[44] The Economist. “Tequila Slammer. The Peso Crisis, ten years on Mexico has still not fully recovered from its worst financial crisis.” Section: Finance and Economics. January, 2005: Economist, Vol. 374, Issue 8407. p 2

[45] Avery, William P. “Domestic Interests in NAFTA Bargaining.” Summer 1998: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 113, No. 2. Published by: The Academy of Political Science. p 288

[46] Robey, John S. “Civil Society and NAFTA.” September 1999: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 565. No. Civil Society and Democratization. p 120

[47] Robey, John S. “Civil Society and NAFTA.” September 1999: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 565. No. Civil Society and Democratization. p 119

[48]Cameron, Maxwell A. and Aggarwal, Vinod K. “Mexican Meltdown: States, Market, and Post-NAFTA Financial Turmoil.” December, 1996: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 5. Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. p 984

[49] NYU School of Law. The NAFTA and Political Economy of Regionalism. Htpp://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990205.html. p 1

[50] The Economist. “Tequila Slammer. The Peso Crisis, ten years on Mexico has still not fully recovered from its worst financial crisis.” Section: Finance and Economics. January, 2005: Economist, Vol. 374, Issue 8407. p 1

[51] U.S. Constitution. Art. II, cl. 2.

[52] Ackerman, Bruce and Golove, David. “Is NAFTA Constitutional.” February, 1995: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 108, No. 4. Published by: The Harvard Law Review Association. p 801

[53] Ackerman, Bruce and Golove, David. “Is NAFTA Constitutional.” February, 1995: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 108, No. 4. Published by: The Harvard Law Review Association. p 803

[54] Ackerman, Bruce and Golove, David. “Is NAFTA Constitutional.” February, 1995: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 108, No. 4. Published by: The Harvard Law Review Association. P 803

[55]  Ackerman, Bruce and Golove, David. “Is NAFTA Constitutional.” February, 1995: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 108, No. 4. Published by: The Harvard Law Review Association. P 897

[56] Ackerman, Bruce and Golove, David. “Is NAFTA Constitutional.” February, 1995: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 108, No. 4. Published by: The Harvard Law Review Association. p 904

[57] Ackerman, Bruce and Golove, David. “Is NAFTA Constitutional.” February, 1995: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 108, No. 4. Published by: The Harvard Law Review Association. p 905

Leave a Reply

You must be logged in to post a comment.

Follow Me!

Follow Me! Follow Me! Follow Me! Follow Me!